This paper explores how loan collateral affects the problem of moral hazard between banks and a deposit insurance agent. First, when the collateral value is certain, it attenuates the volatility of bank returns, thereby making banks more safe and mitigating moral hazard. Here, the paper presents three simple models, in which the collateral value fluctuates and fuels moral hazard. The latter findings are broadly consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis.
Introduction
In the U.S.A numerous subprime banks are presently failing. Subprime banking represents a novel and rapidly growing segment of the mortgage market that channels loans to those borrowers, who fail to meet credit quality requirements in the standard mortgage market. This paper poses the question of whether banks, for example subprime banks, gamble with the value of collateral (real estate). Borrowers of the subprime banks are risky clients but their loans are secured by house property. Even when a borrower cannot earn sufficient income to repay the loan, the bank does not face a loan loss if the value of house property appreciates during the loan period. Thus, the bank makes handsome profits if the collateral value appreciates. If the value of the real estate depreciates, the bank fails because a large share of the borrowers is unable to repay their loans and the value of the collateral does not cover loan repayments. Consequently, the banks are de facto gambling with the upcoming value of real estate.
1
According to the classic banking theory, collateral reduces bank risk. Even when a borrower has insufficient income to repay his loan, a bank can seize the collateral (Bester, 1985; 1987) . This traditional argument has been brought fore in several articles. For brevity, we mention only one example:
"The value of a bank's assets is most likely to fall if borrowers default on their loans or changes in asset prices generate falls in the value of their marketable investments. In both cases, banks can reduce the risks they face by appropriate pricing and screening of transactions, diversifying their asset portfolio or taking collateral (Bell & Pain, 2000, p.113) ." This paper does not deny that collateral reduces bank risk. Rather, the accuracy of the argument is investigated and confirmed in Section 4. Since the value of collateral is certain, it attenuates the volatility of bank income and thereby creates two positive impacts. First, collateral may prevent bank failures and make banks risk-free. Second, it may eliminate the moral hazard problem. That is, the bank will not take excessive risks in lending.
The positive effects of collateral are challenged in Sections 4-6. The sections put forward three models, in which the introduction of collateral generates the moral hazard problem. In each model, the collateral value fluctuates. In Section 4, bank returns are certain without collateral and the moral hazard problem is avoided. Thereafter, collateral is introduced. Its upcoming value is uncertain, which tempts banks to gamble with the collateral. Banks refrain from costly efforts in borrower evaluation, but lending decisions are based on the collateral. If the collateral value is high at the later date, the bank makes a profit. If the collateral value depreciates, the bank fails and the bank regulator, who runs the deposit insurance scheme, pays the costs of excessive risk taking.
Section 5 extends the analysis by demonstrating that the negative effects of collateral are severe if the upcoming value of collateral is closely correlated with the upcoming probability of project success. Section 6 models the example of a subprime bank. The moral hazard effect is shown to be strengthen when outside collateral is replaced with inside collateral, which is funded with the loan capital.
The paper is related to recent research on moral hazard in banking: e.g. Matutes & Vives (1996 , Blum (1999 Blum ( , 2002 , Chiesa (2001) , Niinimäki (2001) , Repullo (2004) , Decamps & Rochet & Roger (2004) , Jeitschko & Jeung (2005) and Kopecky & VanHoose (2006) . When Bester (1985 , 1987 investigates how collateral affects the risk of a single loan, the question to be answered is: how does collateral influence on bank risk at the aggregate level. Does collateral alleviate or worsen the bank's risk of failure? We are primary interested in investigating the scenarios, if any, in which collateral can fuel moral hazard in banking. As mentioned above, we are able to observe these scenarios. Our findings are rather consistent with existing empirical evidence which is surveyed in Section 2. Put differently, the purpose of this paper is to design simple models on loan markets that are based on a few stylized facts given in Section 2 and that can reproduce a few results consistent with the evidence of Section 2. Based on empirical evidence, it is known that banking crises are closely linked to fluctuations in the value of real estate. The paper proposes a theory which explains why banking crisis are connected with fluctuations in real estate markets.
Section 2 reviews empirical evidence and Section 3 presents the model framework.
Section 4 examines how collateral mitigates moral hazard. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present three examples in which collateral may fuel moral hazard, and Section 8 concludes.
Empirical evidence
This section surveys the empirical evidence on collateral, fluctuations in real estate markets and the relationship between collateral value and banking crises.
Observation 1. The ratio of collateral to loan size is high. According to Binks et al. (1993) and de Meza & Southey (1996) , in the U.S.A the ratio of collateral to loan is, on average, 1:2 and in the Great Britain exceeds unity for 85% of loans. In the study by Gonas & Highfield & Mullineux (2004) , 73% of loans for US firms are secured.
Observation 2. A major portion of collateral consists of real estate. According to Borio's (1996) observations, the portion of loans secured by real estate collateral varies in different countries: 59% in Great Britain, 56% in Canada and 66% in United States.
Observation 3. Collateral value, most of all the value of real estate, fluctuates
substantially. In Stockholm, for example, inflation-adjusted property prices rose rapidly in the late 1980s, rising to 450% of the level at the beginning of the decade. From 1989 to 1993, inflationadjusted property prices depreciated to less than the 1982 level (Herring & Wachter, 1999) . US farmland prices appreciated sharply from 1972, peaking in 1981 to more than twice the 1972 level.
From 1981 to 1998, prices reverted to the original level (Herring & Wachter, 1999) . In Japan, commercial property prices rose over 300% during the 1980s despite a very modest inflation rate in consumer prices, but declined again to the initial level over the next five years (Hilbers & Lei & Zacho, 2001) . Using non-performing commercial real estate loans held by FDIC receiverships, Freund & Seelig (1993) investigate changes in the value of collateral on loan-by-loan basis.
Average depreciation in collateral value was 54%. In three-quarters of the loans, the 1992 collateral value was at least 25% below the original evaluation.
Observation 4. Banking crises are commonly preceded by a depreciation in the value
of real estate. Herring and Wachter (1999, p. 2) , for instance, document the following:
"One striking feature of the current Asian financial crisis is that the most seriously affected countries first experienced a collapse in property prices and a consequent weakening of their banking systems before an exchange rate crisis."
In their empirical research, Hilberts & Lei & Zacho (2001) find that on average, real estate prices, adjusted for inflation rose more than 20% within 2 to 7 years before the onset of financial distress but fell more than 15% during the two years prior to the beginning of financial distress. After the onset of financial crises, real estate prices often continued to fall. Zhu's (2003) empirical study focuses on the level of banking profitability and loan loss provisions during the upswing and downward phases of real estate markets. On average, bank profits are almost halved, and loan loss provisions nearly doubled when the value of real estate depreciates. In the FDIC 's extensive empirical analysis on the Savings and Loan Crisis, Hanc (1998. p. 19-24) offers the following conclusions regarding four major regional and sectoral recessions that were associated with widespread bank failures: "Commercial and real estate markets in particular deserve attention because boom and bust activity in these markets was one of the main causes of losses at both failed and surviving banks." For more evidence, see Allen & Madura & Wiant (1995) .
Observation 5. Collateral value is correlated with the cycles of the economy. In their cross-country empirical analysis based on a sample of 17 developed economies, Davis & Zhu (2004) find that GDP has an important impact on commercial property prices. Their findings are supported by Abraham & Hendershott (1996) , who discover that real income growth has a positive effect on real house prices. According to Jacobsen & Naug (2005) , household income raises house prices, while unemployment reduces them in Norway. For more evidence, see Lamont & Stein (1999) .
Economy
The paper includes four models for investigating how collateral affects bank risk. Although the models are separate, they have a few common characteristics, which are presented now.
Consider a risk-neutral economy with banks, borrowers (= entrepreneurs ) and a bank regulator.
2 Each entrepreneur can undertake an investment project, which requires a unit of input capital. Since the entrepreneur has no capital of his own, he needs to seek financing from a bank.
Bank size is 1 and it has no capital of its own. The bank funds its lending by attracting deposits at the interest rate of the economy, r . The deposits are insured by the bank regulator. As is common in this type of model, it is assumed that the regulator cannot directly observe the project risks and loan interest rates. However, the regulator can impose a ruling that banks to grant only collateralized loans.
An entrepreneur can choose from two project types: a good project or a bad project.
When successful, the good project produces G Y units. Its expected probability of success is G µ and its NPV (net present value) is assumed to be clearly positive,
The expected project output covers the interest payment and the cost of monitoring, m . When successful, the bad project produces B Y units. Its expected probability of success is B µ and its NPV is assumed to be negative,
If unsuccessful, both project types yield no output. As is usual in risk-shifting models, the bad project is assumed to be risky in comparison with the good project. Its expected probability of success is low,
, but when it succeeds, the output is large,
2 We assume that a bank manager who monitors the borrowers also owns the bank. Jeitschko & Jeung (2005) investigate risk taking in the case that the bank is owned by shareholders, but the bank manager makes the loan decisions. They observe three optimal risk levels: the manager's most-preferred asset risk, the shareholders' mostpreferred asset risk and the optimal risk choice of the deposit insurer.
Suppose that a bank grants a loan to the entrepreneur at the interest rate of the economy, r . In the absence of monitoring, the risk-shifting problem is assumed to surface. The entrepreneur chooses the bad project since it is expected to yield higher profits to him
3)
The risk-shifting problem can be eliminated by monitoring the entrepreneur. The task is delegated to the bank, which monitors borrowers on the behalf of depositors. Unfortunately, since monitoring incurs a non-monetary cost, m , to the banker, there is a temptation to neglect it. This generates the problem of moral hazard between the bank and the bank regulator. When the bank neglects monitoring, it may earn handsome returns because it has forgone the costs of monitoring.
Alternatively, the bank fails. The banker does not lose anything since the bank regulator, who is a deposit insurance agent, repays the depositors. The banker will exert efforts to monitoring only if it is at least as profitable to the bank as neglecting monitoring.
For brevity, several assumptions are made when the problem of moral hazard is constructed. For example, the model is mainly constructed so that a monitoring bank is risk-free. Thus, under monitoring the deposit insurance premium is zero. 4 In addition, with monitoring the bank makes zero profits because of perfect competition. This makes it easy to examine moral hazard. The bank neglects monitoring if the non-monitoring strategy yields any profits for it.
Uncertain loan losses, certain collateral
In this section the value of collateral is certain, whereas the upcoming share of successful loans is uncertain. The analysis shows that in this environment the introduction of collateral is beneficial since it mitigates moral hazard and may make banking risk-free with monitoring.
To begin with, the model framework needs to be detailed. The upcoming share of successful loans (vice versa loan losses) depends on the upcoming state of the economy (e.g. boom or recession), which is unknown at the beginning of period, when banks grant loans and entrepreneurs invest the loan capital in their projects. With probability b , the economy later booms and with probability b − 1 a recession takes place.
Suppose, first, that a bank monitors. If the economy booms, a project (and a loan) succeeds with probability G n . With a recession, the project succeeds with probability G n ,
The expected probability to succeed is
As regards to the bank's loan portfolio, the upcoming share of successful loans is G n within a boom period and G n in a recession, whereas the expected share of successful loans is G µ .
In the absence of monitoring, a project succeeds with probability B n under a boom and with probability B n in a recession,
In the loan portfolio, the share of successful loans is B n during a boom and B n in a recession, whereas the expected share of successful projects is
It is assumed that a defaulted loan cannot be more valuable to the bank than a performing loan:
Assumption 1. The bank's income from collateral is, at a maximum, equivalent to the loan repayment.
We will first investigate bank returns under monitoring and thereafter in the absence of monitoring.
Under monitoring
Several alternative collateral-interest rate combinations exist which yield the same profits to a borrower. Suppose that the borrower has a fixed amount, C units, outside collateral. A break-even loan interest rate, G R , can be solved from
The expected loan repayments to the bank, 
and it is declining in collateral; the borrower is ready to pledge collateral only if this alternative offers him a reduction in the interest rate. If
, we see that C R G = and the loan is fully collateralized. The borrower's expected profits from the good project are
When the project succeeds, the borrower obtains the output and can repay the loan. When the project fails, the borrower loses the collateral. Given (4.5), the expected profits from the good project are
Only now, when the loan interest rate is defined, the following assumption can be made.
Assumption 2 details the benefits from collateral. A monitoring bank fails when the upcoming share of successful loans is small if the loans are not secured with collateral.
As for the bank returns, two cases arise, depending on whether the upcoming share of successful loans is large or small. When it is large, G n , the bank earns
Inserting the loan interest rate from (4.5) into this equation gives the restated bank returns
bank returns are decreasing in collateral and they are at least m .
When the realized share of successful loans is small, G n , the bank returns are
Recall that the bank fails without collateral, r r m n
(Assumption 2). Now, according to (4.8), collateral increases bank returns since
. If C is sufficiently large, the bank does not fail even when the realized share of successful loans is small. This is easy to verify by inserting
Collateral makes the bank risk-free by increasing its returns during a recession, since even the unsuccessful loans yield some income (collateral) to the bank.
Intuitively, collateral attenuates the volatility of bank returns in two ways. First, it cuts the loan interest rate, thus decreasing bank returns from successful loans. Second, it increases the returns from unsuccessful loans. Due to the introduction of collateral, bank returns decrease during an economic boom when the share of successful loans is large (recall (4.7)). In contrast, bank returns increase during a recession when the share of successful loans is small (see (4.8)).
In the absence of monitoring
Suppose that the bank suggests the non-monitoring strategy to the borrower. Instead of monitoring and forcing the borrower to select the good project, the bank agrees to neglect monitoring so that the borrower can choose the bad project. The borrower accepts the offer if his expected profits from the bad project are at least equal to those from the good project
From which it is easy to solve the highest loan interest rate that is acceptable to the borrower
Only now, when the loan interest rate is defined, the following assumption can be made
Assumption 3 is not essential, but it highlights the benefits from collateral. A non-monitoring bank can repay the depositors in an economic boom, that is, when a large share of loans is successful.
Expected bank returns are now explored. Suppose first that the upcoming share of successful loans is large so that the bank earns returns
. Given the loan interest rate (4.10), the bank returns can be restated Consequently, the bank regulator should require banks to grant loans only against collateral. 
Certain loan losses, uncertain collateral
In this section the upcoming share of successful loans is certain, but the upcoming value of collateral fluctuates. The section examinates how the introduction of collateral may generate the moral hazard problem when banks can gamble with the fluctuating value of collateral.
To begin with, the model setting is updated. Under monitoring, a loan succeeds with certain probability G µ while in the absence of monitoring it succeeds with certain probability B µ .
In the bank's loan portfolio, the share of successful loans is equal to its expected value: B µ in the absence of monitoring and G µ under monitoring. The upcoming value of collateral is uncertain. To keep the analysis simple, the collateral value is modelled in an elementary way. With probability h it is high, C α , and with probability
. The current value of collateral is equal to its expected value
For brevity, the following assumption is made
Assumption 4 implies that under monitoring, bank returns can cover payments on deposits and the bank is risk-free. The moral hazard problem is assumed to appear without monitoring in both cases r C > α and r C < α . That is, without monitoring, a borrower chooses the bad project
Since the collateral value can appreciate, it may exceed r and the borrower has wealth, r C − α , even when his project fails.
Under monitoring
Note that without collateral, the borrower's expected returns are 0
. He accepts such loan interest rate / collateral combinations, which satisfy his participation constraint
, from which it is easy to solve the loan interest rate
Since a certain share of loans succeeds, the bank returns are 0 ) 1
, when the upcoming value of collateral is high and 0 ) 1
, when it is low. Thanks to Assumption 4, the bank can pay back deposits in both cases. More importantly, the bank is now risk-free without collateral since 0 ) 0
In the absence of monitoring
The bank neglects monitoring and borrowers can invest in the bad projects. The loan interest rate / collateral combinations need to satisfy the borrower's participation constraint
Two cases occur, depending on whether
The case
In this section it is assumed that
The loan interest rate can be solved from (5.4) as
Without collateral, bank returns are certain and negative 0 ) 0
2). The non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable, the moral hazard problem is avoided and the bank optimally monitors! With collateral, the expected bank returns are
Inserting loan interest rate from (5.5) into (5.6) gives
In the second set of brackets (the collateral value is low) the first term is negative since r Y B B < µ .
In the first set of brackets (the collateral value is high) the first term is positive if
sufficiently large. This is true if the initial amount of collateral, C , is relatively high and if the collateral value appreciates; that is, α is great. Then, the bank earns profit Moral hazard appears when the initial value of collateral, C, is relatively high. A banking crisis occurs when the collateral value depreciates. This is consistent with Observation 4 in Section 2.
. The loan interest rate can again be solved from (5.4) 
The term in the second set of brackets is 0 (Appendix B). In the first brackets, the term is positive if r R B > . From (5.10) it is possible to observe that this is true if
Since the first term is positive (this is possible to observe from (5.2)), the inequality is satisfied if the second term is sufficiently small. Consequently, the problem of moral hazard may appear also when B R C > α ! See Footnote 6 for a numeric example. 7 Maybe surprisingly, the moral hazard problem is avoided if the initial value of collateral is very high.
Remark 1. If the initial amount of collateral is very high, for example
α / r C = ,
the nonmonitoring strategy is unprofitable and the moral hazard problem is eliminated.
To see this, suppose first that If the initial amount of collateral is very high, α / r C = , the collateral value is so high that a defaulted loan yields at least r C = α , which covers interest on deposits. Thus, the loan is (almost) risk-free; there is no gamble. Furthermore, when the initial amount of collateral is very high, entrepreneurs are ready to borrow only if the loan interest rate is lower than r . Then the bank goes into bankruptcy with certainty.
Remark 1, however, underestimates gambling with collateral, since collateral consists entirely of outside collateral. When inside collateral is used, the problem of moral hazard may appear even when the initial amount of collateral is very high. This is explored in section 7.
Discussion
Diamond (1984) Thanks to the law of large numbers, the loan portfolio is perfectly diversified and its return is certain. Therefore, depositors can rely on the bank being safe.
The initial part of this section follows the vision of Diamond (1984) . Thanks to the law of large numbers, the share of successful loans is certain. Thus, without collateral the bank is motivated to monitor borrowers and is risk-free. Thereafter, collateral is introduced. Given the findings of Section 4, it may appear that the bank regulator can be relieved. Two tools, monitoring and collateral, are simultaneously utilized to eliminate moral hazard even through one tool is sufficient. Unfortunately, the appearance is faulty. The introduction of collateral may fuel moral hazard.
Intuitively, without collateral the bank cannot to seek a correlated risk for its loan portfolio. The loan portfolio is perfectly diversified, which eliminates moral hazard. The introduction of collateral changes the state of affairs, since the value of each borrower's collateral is the same: low or high. Collateral offers a correlated risk to gamble with. It is rather insignificant to the bank whether or not a borrower is able to earn income and thereby repay his loan. Crucial is the collateral value; if it is high, the bank makes a handsome profit, but if it is low, it fails.
There is abundant evidence to suggest that lending decisions are often based on collateral. As to the Savings and Loan Crisis in U.S.A, Freund & Curry & Hirch & Kelly (1998, p. 
155) document:
"Traditionally, decisions to extend loans that are collateralized by commercial real estate property are evaluated by lenders primarily on the borrowers' ability to generate earnings from the investment sufficient to cover the existing debt payments. This is a fundamental tenet of the lending function. As a backup source of security, lenders evaluate the worth of investment property as potential collateral to cover the loan value in the case of default by the borrower. Starting in the late 1970s and continuing for the most of the following decade, examiners observed that lenders loosened loan terms relating to debt-service coverage and placed relatively more emphasis on the value of the collateral in making funding decisions. This change in loan procedures was based primarily on the assumption that real estate values (collateral values) would continue to rise in the future as they had in the recent past. …. When the real estate markets collapsed starting in the late 1980s, many lenders discovered that collateral values were often insufficient to cover existing loan losses".
The banking crisis in Japan was preceded by similar lending policy. Herring & Wachter (1999, p.40) report: "Some banks apparently tended to rely on the rising value of land rather than rigorous credit analysis in underwriting loans." Hilberts & Lei & Zacho (2001, p. 14) underline that before the banking crises in Finland and Sweden "lending decisions relied primary on availability of collateral rather than cash flow evaluations." As regards to the Asian crisis, Collyns and Senhadji (2005, p. 112) note: "Typically, techniques for credit assessment by banks were weakly developed, and banks tended to rely heavily on property collateral (and, to some extent, equity collateral) in making loan decisions." Consequently, evidence supports the view that many banks neglect monitoring and gamble with the collateral value.
Uncertain loan losses, uncertain collateral
Recall that collateral incurs costs to a bank, since a borrower is ready to pledge collateral only if in this way he can cut the loan interest rate. On the other hand, the bank benefits from collateral through unsuccessful loans: when a loan defaults, the bank can seize collateral. The introduction of collateral is profitable to a non-monitoring bank if the second effect dominates. As Section 5 reveals, the second effect dominates if the collateral value fluctuates widely. This section extends the analysis by showing that the second effect may also be prevalent if the upcoming value of collateral is strongly correlated with the upcoming probability of project success. When the collateral value is high, the probability of success is also high and vice versa. Since a thorough examination is complex, the analysis has been shortened considerably. Banking under monitoring, for example, is simplified.
As above, under monitoring (in the absence of monitoring ) the upcoming share of successful loans in the loan portfolio is either small, G n ( B n ), or large, G n ( B n ), and has an expected value G µ ( B µ ). In addition, the initial amount of collateral is C . Its upcoming value is uncertain and it is either high, C α (with probability h ), or low, C α (with probability In the absence of monitoring, the loan interest rate is such that an entrepreneur is ready to select the bad project. His expected profits are at least the same as from the good project
The L.H.S gives the borrower's profits in four states of the world: high collateral value and large share of successful loans, high collateral value and small share of successful loans, low collateral value and large share of successful loans as well as low collateral value and small share of successful loans. Here ( )
) denotes the probability that the share of successful loans is large (small) when the collateral value is high. In addition, ( )
represents the probability, that the share of successful loans is large (small) when the collateral value is low. Obviously, it is known that )
The expected probability of success can now be expressed by summing the expected probabilities of success in the four state of the world
, the loan interest, (6.1), can be restated as
(6.3)
Here (6.3) reveals that the highest loan interest acceptable to borrowers is maximized when ) ( α n P is as large as possible. Given
is then as small as possible. Using (6.2),
it is possible to show that when ) ( α n P is maximized,
Hence, the loan interest rate is as high as possible when the upcoming share of successful loans (that is, the upcoming probability that a loan succeeds) is closely correlated with the upcoming value of collateral. Intuitively, given the borrower's participation constraint, collateral cuts the highest loan interest rate that is acceptable to borrowers. This represents the cost of the collateral to the bank. The more severe the borrower's risk to collateral loss, the larger the required cut in the loan interest rate. When the upcoming collateral value is closely correlated with the upcoming share of successful loans, the costs of collateral are minimized. More specifically, when the value of collateral is high, the probability that a project fails is minimal. It is unlikely that the borrower loses valuable collateral. On the contrary, when the borrower's project is likely to fail, the collateral value is low. Therefore, even if the borrower loses the collateral, his losses are minor. Thus, the expected costs of collateral are relatively insignificant to the borrower and he is ready to pledge the collateral if the loan interest rate declines slightly. This is, of course, profitable for the banks.
Since the problem is complex, we analyze it with a numeric example. Suppose that
. In this economy, the following inequalities are satisfied
The first inequality states that the bank fails when the share of successful loans is at the expected level, B µ , even when the value of collateral is high. That is, the variation in collateral value alone is not sufficient to generate the problem of moral hazard. The second assumption states that the bank fails when the share of successful loans peaks, but the value of collateral is at the expected, average level. Thus, the variation in the share of successful loans alone is not sufficient to cause the moral hazard problem.
First, the probability of success and the collateral value are independent:
Given (6.3) the loan interest rate is 1.022, which is less than the interest on deposits. Banking is unprofitable. Second, the probability of success and the collateral value are completely correlated:
. Given (6.3), the loan interest rate is 1.108, which exceeds the interest on deposits. Thus, banking may be profitable. Given (6.4), if the bank can make a profit, it does so when a large probability of success coincides with the high value of collateral. Thus, bank returns amount to 
It is easy to see that bank returns are increasing in ) ( α , and when the amount of collateral is sufficiently large, e.g .
, banking is profitable without monitoring. Thus, the bank optimally neglects monitoring.
It is important to note from (6.4) that the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable without collateral. In addition, (6.4) states that the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable if the collateral value fluctuates, but the share of successful loans is certain. This case (uncertain collateral, certain loan losses) is identical as that described in Section 4, but now the moral hazard problem is now avoided. Only if the share of successful loans also fluctuates, banking may be profitable without monitoring and the problem of moral hazard appears. Consequently, the moral hazard effect of uncertain collateral is strengthened by the uncertain share of successful loans. Furthermore, the larger the correlation between the collateral value and the share of successful loans, the more likely it is that the moral hazard problem appears.
Proposition 3. When the volatility of collateral value alone is insufficient to generate moral hazard, the problem of moral hazard may occur if the upcoming share of successful loans also
fluctuates. That is, the probability that the collateral value is high simultaneously with the large share of successful loans is sufficiently great.
Inside collateral
Let us again repeat the two effects of collateral.
i.) When the initial amount of collateral, C, raises, the loan interest rate has to decline due to the borrowers' participation constraint ii.) Unsuccessful loans yield collateral income to banks.
Collateral fuels moral hazard only when the second effect dominates. Section 5 shows that the second effect may dominate when the collateral value fluctuates widely. The first effect -the decline of the loan interest rate -is small, if the initial amount of collateral is not too high. The second effect is strong if the upcoming value of collateral can be high. Section 6 demonstrates that the second effect dominates if the probability of loan success and the collateral value are closely correlated. Then, the first effect is small since the expected loses of the borrower are minimal. The second effect is strong if the upcoming value of collateral can be high. 9 Finally, this section shows that the second effect dominates if collateral consists of inside collateral, which is funded with the loan capital. Since the collateral incurs no costs to borrowers, the first effect is removed and the second effect dominates the first effect.
To model this, the framework is updated. Since an entrepreneur has no capital of his own, he needs to seek for a bank loan. The loan size is 1 unit and is used to purchase assets, which are pledged as collateral, 1 = C unit. The bank size is 1 and it has no capital of its own. The bank funds its loans by attracting deposits at the interest rate of the economy, r .
The entrepreneur can choose from two project types: a good project or a bad project.
When successful, the good project produces G Y units. Its expected probability of success is fixed, G µ . The bad project succeeds with probability B µ producing B Y units,
.When unsuccessful, the value of both projects is either C α or C α depending on that whether the value of collateral appreciates (with probability h ) or depreciates (with probability h − 1 ) during the project.
As before, the expected NPV of the good project is assumed to be clearly positive
whereas the expected NPV of the bad project is negative 9 Recall that in Sections 5 and 6, collateral is outside collateral. Outside collateral refers to the case where a borrowing entrepreneur pledges assets not used in the project.
Without monitoring, the risk-shifting problem is assumed to appear. The borrower chooses the bad project since it yields higher expected profits for him
Note that the borrower cannot lose collateral, since it is purchased with the loan capital. On the contrary, if the collateral value appreciates during the loan period, it exceeds the loan repayment, where B R is solved from the borrowers' participation constraint. The loan interest rate, B R , needs to be such that the borrowers obtain the same expected profits as by choosing the good project
Inserting B R from (7.5) into (7.4) gives two scenarios. First, when
We show below in a numeric example that the inequality may be satisfied. Second, when
the non-monitoring strategy is profitable if r R B > . Given (7.5), this means that
Given (7.3), this is true. Recall from (5.8) that with outside equity moral hazard appears when
The L.H.S is smaller than in (7.6); the moral hazard problem is more severe with inside collateral.
Even when the problem of moral hazard is avoided with outside collateral, it may appear with inside collateral. The intuition is obvious. With outside collateral, the borrower faces a risk of losing his own wealth, whereas with inside collateral the borrower cannot lose anything since he has not invested his own wealth in the project. The whole project is funded with the loan capital.
10
The required rise of the collateral value can be small. 
Conclusion
This paper has explored how collateral affects bank risk. We have seen that if the collateral value is certain, the introduction of collateral alleviates the volatility of bank returns, thereby making banks more safe and mitigating moral hazard. If the value of collateral fluctuates, the introduction of collateral may generate a moral hazard problem. This negative effect of collateral may deepen if the value of collateral is strongly correlated with the project's probability to success. The negative effect is also deepened if collateral consists of inside collateral, which is financed with the loan capital.
We do not insist that collateral is the main cause of the recent banking crises.
However, we argue that in some cases, for example in the subprime mortgage crisis and in emerging economies, collateral may have played a crucial role. Subprime mortgage lending satisfies the conditions that induce moral hazard: collateral value fluctuates strongly, it is correlated with the probability to earn income and collateral consists mostly of inside collateral, which is funded with the loan capital. 11 Furthermore, the borrowers of subprime banks are risky clients willing to pay high interest on loans. Thus, it is likely that the problem of moral hazard appears. A few subprime banks relying on the rising value of real estate have granted loans to loan applicants without attempts at borrower evaluation. and the term in the second brackets of (5.12) is equal to zero; the bank fails when the collateral value depreciates. Q.E.D
